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Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer are multilateral
environmental agreements that regulate the use of chemicals that
contribute to climate change and ozone depletion.

The Montreal

Protocol, however, encourages the replacement of ozone depleting
substances with chemicals that contribute to climate change.
Likewise, the Kyoto Protocol encourages the production of an
ozone depleting substance by allowing companies to profit by
destroying the byproduct of its manufacture.

This comment

attempts to resolve these conflicts through conventional and
customary international law.

It concludes that the treaty

regimes can apply favorability, effectiveness, and cooperation
principles to resolve the conflicts, and recommends changes to
the Montreal Protocol regime to implement these principles.
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"Seen from a distance in such weather, Coketown lay shrouded in
a haze of its own, which appeared impervious to the sun's
rays...A blur of soot and smoke...a dense formless jumble, with
sheets of cross light in it, that showed nothing but masses of
darkness. Coketown in the distance was suggestive of itself,
though not a brick of it could be seen.1"
-Charles Dickens, from Hard Times, 1854.

INTRODUCTION
In Hard Times, Dickens describes a nineteenth century
industrial town shrouded in smoke. A century and a half later,
our society has progressed away from the kind of air pollution
that made industrial towns such as Coketown impervious blurs to
distant onlookers.2

1

However, in the 1970's, scientists became

Charles Dickens, Hard Times 115 (Karen Oden ed., Barnes & Noble

Classics 2004) (1854).
2

See generally Air Emissions Trends: Continued Progress through

2005, http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/econ-emissions.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2006) (demonstrating that air quality has
improved in the United States over the last several decades).
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increasingly concerned that the effects of industrial emissions
went beyond dirty and unhealthy air.3
First, since the 1950's the scientific community has
gradually accepted that the emission of greenhouse gases such as
carbon dioxide4 prevents heat from the earth's surface from

3

See Michael Grubb with Christiaan Vrolijk & Duncan Brack, The

Kyoto Protocol: A Guide and Assessment 4 (1999) (stating that
international bodies became increasingly concerned about climate
change in the 1970's). Swedish scientist Arrhenius and French
scientist Fourier first proposed the theory of climate change in
the nineteenth century and the scientific community first
accepted the theory in the 1950's. Id. at 4-5. See also Richard
Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding
the Planet 10-11 (1998) (stating that scientists began to
theorize in the 1970's that some man-made chemicals could
deplete the layer of stratospheric ozone in the upper
atmosphere).
4

See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change annex A, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (listing substances that the Kyoto
Protocol regime considers to be greenhouse gases); Grubb, supra
note 3, at 3 (noting that carbon dioxide and water vapor are
examples of greenhouse gases).
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escaping into the atmosphere, which increases global
temperatures, and results in climate change.5

The results of

climate change are potentially catastrophic, including rising
ocean levels, drought, the extinction of organisms, and the
spread of disease.6
Secondly, in the 1970's, scientists discovered that the
emission of man-made chlorofluorocarbons ("CFC’s")7 and other,

5

See Environmental Investigation Agency, Turning Up the Heat:

Linkages between Ozone Layer Depletion and Climate Change: The
Urgent Case of HCFC's and HFC's 3 (2006) [hereinafter EIA
Report]; Grubb, supra note 3, at 3-4. (describing the greenhouse
effect as what happens when solar radiation comes in contact
with the earth's surface).
6

See Scott Barnett, The Problem of Averting Global Catastrophe,

6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 527, 546-47 (2006) (describing the effects of
climate change as the melting of polar ice caps, rising ocean
levels, the collapse of the gulf stream, unpredictable weather
patterns, and the spread of diseases such as malaria,
meningitis, and rotavirus).
7

See Benedick, supra note 3, at 10 (stating that CFC's are

stable, nonflammable, odorless chemicals that industries often
used in refrigeration, as propellants, and as insulators).
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methane based chemicals8 have caused the deterioration of the
stratospheric ozone layer.9

The stratospheric ozone layer repels

harmful ultraviolet radiation from the sun.10 Overexposure to
ultraviolet radiation causes skin cancer and blindness in humans
and various health problems in animals.11
Currently, there are two treaties in place to deal with
these issues: the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete

8

See id., at 12 (stating that methane based substances commonly

used as ignition fluid and pesticides contribute to ozone
depletion).
9

See generally British Antarctic Survey: Natural Environment

Research Council, Meteorology and Ozone Monitoring Unit,
Antarctic Ozone, http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/met/jds/
ozone/index.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2006) (describing the
size of the hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica in 2005 and
2006).
10

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that the ozone

layer prevents ninety-nine percent of solar ultraviolet
radiation from reaching the earth's surface).
11

See id. at 2. (demonstrating that ozone depletion may have

already caused increases in melanoma and cataracts in humans).
The EIA also demonstrates that ozone depletion causes health
problems in various species of plants and animals. Id.
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the Ozone Layer12 ("Montreal Protocol") and the Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
("Kyoto Protocol").13 Observers generally consider the Montreal

12

See Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer

art. 2, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 [hereinafter Vienna Ozone
Convention] (setting forth the goal of Vienna Ozone Convention
and its protocols as the prevention of stratospheric ozone
depletion); see also Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 14, Sept. 19, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol] (demonstrating the Montreal
Protocol's relationship with the Vienna Ozone Convention, its
parent treaty); Laura Thoms, A Comparative Analysis of
International Regimes on Ozone and Climate Change with
Implications for Regime Design, 41 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 795,
801-802 (2003) (describing the Vienna Ozone Convention). The
author argues that the adoption of the Montreal Protocol made
the Vienna Ozone Convention successful by implementing the goal
of preventing ozone depletion articulated in the Vienna
Convention. Id. at 802.
13

See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.

2, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 [UNFCCC] (stating that the goal of
UNFCC as the prevention of radical change in the earth's climate
system); see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at pmbl.
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Protocol a more successful treaty than the Kyoto Protocol.14
Unfortunately, the success of the Montreal Protocol could
undermine any potential gains against climate change made by the
Kyoto Protocol.15

(demonstrating that the Kyoto Protocol shares the purpose of the
UNFCCC).
14

See Aaron Schwabach, International Environmental Disputes 71-

79 (2006) (comparing the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols). The
Kyoto Protocol officially became effective in 2004. Id. at 77.
Schwabach argues, however, that the Kyoto Protocol has not yet
been as successful as the Montreal Protocol. Id. at 73-74; see
also Thoms, supra note 12, at 797 (comparing the Montreal and
Kyoto Protocol regimes). The author argues as of 2003 that while
the Montreal Protocol regime has been largely successful, the
Kyoto Protocol has not. Id. Thoms wrote this article before the
Kyoto Protocol officially took effect and it focuses on the
structure of the Kyoto Protocol. Id. at 812-16.
15

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 6 (reporting that the Kyoto

Protocol attempts to prevent the emission of 950 million metric
tons of carbon) A joint report by the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocol regimes predicts that the emission of ozone depletion
substitutes will be two billion metric tons of carbon, which is
over twice as much carbon as the Kyoto Protocol seeks to
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This Comment argues that the Montreal Protocol treaty
regime and the Kyoto Protocol treaty regime have a legal
obligation to cooperate in effectively regulating the global
atmosphere. Part I briefly describes the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocols. Part I then details how, by encouraging the
replacement of CFC's with greenhouse gases, the Montreal
Protocol undermines the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol.
Part I then details how the Kyoto Protocol gives its parties
incentive to produce substances that the Montreal Protocol
attempts to phase out. Next, Part I describes sources of
conventional international conflict of treaty law. Finally, Part
I describes sources of customary international law, especially
regarding multilateral environmental agreements.
Part II discusses how conventional conflict of treaty
principles and the principle of lex specialis cannot adequately
address the conflict between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols.
Part II also discusses how the "most favorable treaty" principle

prevent. Id. at 9 (citing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and Technological & Economic Assessment Panel, IPCC/TEAP
Special Report: Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global
Climate System: Issues Related to Hydrofluorocarbons and
Perfluorocarbons, (2005) [hereinafter IPCC/TEAP Special
Report]).
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commonly included in multilateral environmental agreements can
adequately address part of the conflict. Part II then analyzes
how the "most effective treaty" principle and principles of
treaty cooperation can solve the remainder of the conflict.
Lastly, Part III argues that the treaty regimes can operate more
effectively by substituting substances with the best available
alternative, integrating their assessment of global atmospheric
problems, and encouraging solutions that will have the best
overall impact on reducing ozone depletion and controlling
climate change.
I. BACKGROUND
The Montreal and Kyoto Protocols are multilateral
environmental agreements. The Montreal Protocol regime
encourages the use of certain substances controlled by the Kyoto
Protocol. Also, the Kyoto Protocol regime encourages the
manufacture of certain substances controlled by the Montreal
Protocol. However, principles of conventional and customary
international law exist that may resolve this conflict.
A. Defining the Montreal Protocol.

13

The Montreal Protocol opened for signature in 1987.16 It is
a protocol to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the
Ozone Layer ("Vienna Ozone Convention"),17 which opened for
signature in 1985.18 Both the Vienna Ozone Convention and the
Montreal Protocol work to prevent the use of chemicals that
damage that stratospheric ozone layer of the earth's upper

16

See Benedick, supra note 3, at 1 (citing Montreal Protocol,

supra note 12, at art. 15) (stating that the Montreal Protocol
opened for signature on September 16, 1987).
17

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 14 (stating that

the provisions Vienna Ozone Convention apply unless the Montreal
Protocol states otherwise).
18

See Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 12, at art. 21

(stating that the Vienna Ozone Convention opened for signature
on March 22, 1985).
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atmosphere.19 Damage to the ozone layer could result in negative
effects on the health of humans and animals.20
The Montreal Protocol regime establishes phase-outs of
ozone depleting substances, and funds the development of
substitutes through its Multilateral Fund.21 Substances

19

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2 (stating the

regulations that the Montreal Protocol regime places on ozone
depleting substances); Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 12,
at art. 2 (stating the purpose of the Vienna Ozone Convention as
the protection of the earth's stratospheric ozone layer).
20

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 2 (describing the effects of

ozone depletion as the spread of disease, increases in skin
cancer rates, damage to zooplankton stocks, and damage to
agricultural plants).
21

See Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal

Protocol: Particularly Remarkable and Remarkably Particular, 19
UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 49, 53-54 (2001) (describing the
Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund as a system that
encourages the replacement of ozone depleting substances with
various substances that cause less damage to the ozone layer).
DeSombre argues that the strength of the Montreal Protocol is
its ability to make adjustments without formal amendments. Id at
54.
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controlled by the Montreal Protocol include CFC's,22 which are
aerosol propellants and refrigeration chemicals23 such as CFC-11
and CFC-12.24

The Montreal protocol also controls hydro-

chlorofluorocarbons (HCFC),25 such as the refrigeration chemical
HCFC-22,26 and pesticides such as Methyl Bromide.27

22

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2A (establishing

the phase-out schedule for CFC's).
23

See Elias Mossos, The Montreal Protocol and the Difficulty

with International Change, 10 Alb. L. Envtl. Outlook J. 1, 2-8
(2005) (mentioning that CFC's are aerosol propellants); Jennifer
S. Bales, Transnational Responsibility and Recourse for Ozone
Depletion, 19 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 259, 265 (1996)
(stating that industries use CFC's as refrigeration coolants and
in Styrofoam).
24

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at annex A (listing CFC-

11 and CFC-12 as chemicals controlled by the Montreal Protocol
regime).
25

See id., supra note 12, at art. 2F (establishing the phase-out

schedule for HCFC's).
26

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 8 (mentioning that the air

conditioner industry uses HCFC-22 as a coolant).
27

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2H (establishing

the phase-out schedule for methyl bromide); Sondra Goldschein,

16

B. Defining the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol opened for signature in 1997.28 It is a
protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC),29 which opened for signature in 1992.30 The
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol work to prevent climate change by
limiting the emission of greenhouse gases.31 The effects of

Note, Methyl Bromide: The Disparity between the Pesticide's
Phase-out Dates Under the Clean Air Act and the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 4 Envtl.
Law. 577, 577 (1998) (defining Methyl Bromide as a pesticide).
28

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 28 (stating that the

Kyoto Protocol opened for signature on December 11, 1997).
29

See id., at pmbl. (stating that the Kyoto Protocol is a

protocol to the UNFCCC).
30

See UNFCCC, supra note 13, at art. 26 (stating that the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change opened for
signature on May 9, 1992).
31

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 2 (stating the goal

of the Kyoto Protocol as limiting emissions of greenhouse gases
to prevent radical climate change); UNFCC, supra note 13, at
art. 2 (stating the objective of the UNFCCC is to prevent
radical climate change).

17

radical climate change include rising ocean levels and the
spread of disease.32
The Kyoto Protocol regime establishes a complex emissions
cap and trade system which allows parties that do not meet their
caps to transfer their extra allowance to other parties who are
over their caps.33 The regime controls and enforces this system
through its Clean Development Mechanism34 and the decisions of
its Conference of the Parties.35 Substances controlled by the
Kyoto Protocol include pollutants such as the hydro fluorocarbon
HFC-23.36

32

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the effects of

climate change as melting polar ice and the spread of diseases
such as malaria and respiratory infections).
33

See Grubb, supra note 3, at 198-200 (describing the system of

emissions capping and trading under the Kyoto Protocol).
34

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 12 (defining the

role and function of the clean development mechanism).
35

See id. at art. 9 (describing the functions of the Conference

of the Parties).
36

See id. at annex A (stating that the Kyoto Protocol caps the

emissions of hydro fluorocarbons).
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C. Defining the Conflicts Between the Kyoto and Montreal
Protocols
The conflicts between the treaties stem from two realities.
First, most ozone depleting substances are also greenhouse
gases.37 Secondly, both the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols regulate
the same physical object: the global atmosphere.38 Although ozone
depletion and climate change result from separate chemical
processes,39 many substances, especially CFC's, contribute to
37

See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 6. (displaying

the global warming potential of ozone depleting substances and
their replacements). The report also displays charts showing
expected increases of ozone depleting substances in the
atmosphere over the next several years. Id. at 9.
38

Compare UNFCCC, supra note 13, at art. 2 (stating that the

purpose of the UNFCCC is to prevent climate change) with Vienna
Ozone Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2 (stating that the
purpose of treaties under the Vienna Ozone Conventions is to
take action against damage to the atmospheric ozone layer).
39

See also Thoms, supra note 12, at 823-24

(arguing that ozone

depletion is a simpler and more predictable problem than climate
change). Few substances cause ozone depletion compared to
substances that cause climate change. Id. at 823 Furthermore,
the effects of ozone depletion are limited to the ozone layer
rather than the entire climate system. Id. at 823-24. Finally,

19

both problems.40

Although the Montreal Protocol is responsible

for combating climate change by phasing out CFC's,41 it is also
responsible for the replacement of CFC's with hydro
fluorocarbons

("HFC’s") and hydro chlorofluorocarbons

("HCFC’s"),42 which serve the many of the same functions as CFC's

the effects of ozone depletion are predictable, unlike the
effects of climate change which are unpredictable. Id. at 824.
40

See also IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 6

(displaying a chart showing the global warming potential of
several ozone depleting substances such as CFC's, HCFC's, and
HFC's). The global warming potential of CFC's ranges from 10,720
times that of carbon dioxide to 4680 times. Id. The global
warming potential of HCFC's range from 3270 times that of carbon
dioxide to 76 times. Id. Finally, the global warming potential
of HFC's range from 14,310 to 122 times that of carbon dioxide.
Id.
41

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that by

successfully phasing out the use of CFC's, the Montreal Protocol
regime has had a positive effect on climate change).
42

See DeSombre, supra note 21, at 62 (stating that the Montreal

Protocol's Multilateral Fund allows developing countries to
purchase CFC substitute technology); Benedick, supra note 3, at

20

with a lesser effect on the ozone layer (or no effect on the
ozone layer in the case of HFC's).43

However, both of these

substances generally contribute to climate change.44

Although

200-201 (stating that industries have often replaced CFC's with
HFC's and HCFC's).
43

See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 18 (stating

that HFC's have no effect on ozone depletion because they do not
contain chlorine); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer, United Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP],
Report of the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel, HCFC
Task Force Report 1-2 (May 2003) [hereinafter TEAP HCFC Report]
(demonstrating that the ozone depletion potential of HCFC's is
lower than the substances that they replace).
44

See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 6 (displaying

a chart showing the global warming potential of ozone depleting
substances). The IPCC/TEAP Special report states that various
HFC's and HCFC's have high global warming potentials, which is
how much of a greenhouse effect a substance has in comparison to
carbon dioxide. Id. For example, HFC-23, a variant of HFC's, has
a global warming potential of 14,130. Id. This means that one
metric ton of HFC-23 is 14,130 times more effective at warming
the atmosphere than one metric tonne of carbon dioxide. Id. But
see Stephen O. Anderson & Durwood Zaelke, Industry Genius:

21

the Montreal Protocol regime has mandated the phase-out of
HCFC's,45 the manufacture of HCFC's has increased in developing

Inventions and People Protecting the Climate and Fragile Ozone
Layer, 161-62 (2003) (stating that, when used in industrial,
emissions-free air conditioners, one kind of HCFC, HCFC-123, has
a high enough energy efficiency that its global warming
potential is minimized).
45

See TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 77 (describing the

specific phase-out schedule for HCFC's). Developed nations, such
as the United States and European Union nations, will gradually
phase-out HCFC's by 2020. Id. Developing nations, such as India,
China, and Brazil, will have their HCFC use capped in 2016 and
phase-out HCFC use by 2040. Id. at 77-78. See also Montreal
Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 5 (setting forth the nations
that the Montreal Protocol considers developed and developing
nations).
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nations that are not yet subject to the phase-out.46

Finally,

the Kyoto Protocol specifically regulates HFC's.47
In 1994 the Montreal Protocol regime began phasing out
HCFC's but not HFC's.48

Industries commonly substitute HFC's for

ozone depleting substances, especially HFC-134a, which has
become the preferred substitute for CFC's in refrigerators, air
conditioners, and heat pumps since the adoption of the Montreal

46

See EIA Report, supra note 5, 8 (citing IPCC/TEAP Special

Report, supra note 15) (describing a rapid increase in HCFC
product over the past several years, most notably in China and
India).
47

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (listing carbon

dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons,
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride as greenhouse gases
regulated by the Kyoto Protocol).
48

See Benedick, supra note 3, at 228-31. (stating that the

Montreal Protocol regime plans a phase-out of HCFC's). However,
he also states that the Montreal Protocol regime refused to
phase-out HFC's despite their global warming potential. Id.
HFC's do not contain chlorine, which is essential to the ozone
depletion process. Id. Therefore, they do not contribute to
ozone depletion. Id.

23

Protocol.49

Also, the manufacture of HCFC's, most notably the

air conditioner coolant HCFC-22, continues to expand in
countries where the Montreal Protocol regime has not yet
implemented a phase-out, especially in China.50
1. The HFC-134a Conflict

49

See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 6 (describing

the high global warming potential of HFC's); see also Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, United
Nations Environmental Programme [UNEP], Report of the Technology
and Economic Assessment Panel, Progress Report 5.2 57-63 (2006)
[hereinafter TEAP 2006 Report] (implying that the Montreal
Protocol regime has influenced the expanded use of HFC's in air
conditioning systems). This report describes the widespread use
of HFC as a substitute for CFC, especially HFC-134a, as progress
because it results in limiting use of CFC's and HCFC's. Id. at
57l.
50

See TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 26-27 (describing the

world market growth for small air conditioners manufactured in
China, using HCFC-22 as a coolant).
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The Kyoto Protocol specifically caps the emissions of
HFC's,51 including HFC-134a, a coolant commonly used in household
and automobile air conditioners.52

The Kyoto Protocol Conference

of the Parties has noted that the Montreal Protocol regime's
Multilateral Fund encourages the replacement of ozone depleting
substances with greenhouse gases,53 including HFC-134a.54

51

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (listing HFC

among substances whose industrial emissions are capped by the
Kyoto Protocol).
52

See TEAP 2006 Report, supra note 49, at 57-63 (describing the

use of HFC-134a along with other coolants); see also EIA Report,
supra note 5, at 6 (stating that the Kyoto Protocol regime caps
the emissions of HFC-134a); IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note
15, at 6 (stating that the global warming potential of HFC-134a
is 1410 times that of carbon dioxide). The European Union has
planned a phase-out of HFC-134a in order to lower their
greenhouse gas emissions. Id at 16.
53

See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

[UNFCCC], Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Eighth
Session, Oct. 23-Nov. 1, 2002, Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties at its Eighth Session 30 (Mar. 28,
2003) (noting that the Montreal Protocol encourages the
replacement of ozone depleting substances with greenhouse gases

25

in some instances). The report recommends policies to fix this
problem, such as encouraging governments and industries to
consider the climate change implications when developing
substitutes for ozone depleting substances. Id; see also Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 2 (implying that the Conference
of the Parties cannot recommend that the Kyoto Protocol regime
regulate HCFC because the Kyoto Protocol exempts HCFC and other
substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol regime from its
regulations).
54

See generally United Nations Multilateral Fund Secretariat,

Project Completion Report ALG/REF/26/INV/30 (2006) available at
http://www.unmfs.org/pcr/databases.asp (search for
ALG/REF/26/INV/30) (describing the money used by the
Multilateral Fund to phase-out a CFC's and replace them with
HFC-134a in Algeria); United Nations Multilateral Fund
Secretariat, Evaluation Report on MAC Projects in India (2003)
available at http://www.unmfs.org /policydoc/policy47p614.htm
(describing projects by the Multilateral Fund to replace ozone
depleting automobile cooling equipment with HFC-134a equipment
in India). See also TEAP 2006 Report, supra note 49, at 62
(stating that HFC-134a is the global standard for mobile air
conditioning); EIA Report, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that the

26

Therefore, while the Kyoto Protocol discourages the use of HFC134a because it is a greenhouse gas, the Montreal Protocol
encourages the use of HFC-134a as a substitute for CFC's in
refrigeration and air conditioning equipment by funding it
through its Multilateral Fund.
2. The HCFC-22/HFC-23 Conflict
Another conflict between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols
involves HCFC-22, a coolant used in air conditioners and
refrigerators, and the gas emitted as a byproduct of its
manufacture, HFC-23.55

The Kyoto Protocol exempts from its

Montreal Protocol regime promotes HFC-134a as an alternative to
ozone depleting substances).
55

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 7-9. (detailing the HCFC-

22/HFC-23 conflict). The EIA describes what they refer to as the
"perverse incentive" for developing countries to manufacture
HCFC-22 in order to collect and destroy its byproduct, HFC-23.
Id. at 9. Industries can destroy HFC-23 to gain Kyoto Protocol
emissions credits, and the cost of capturing and destroying HFC23 is inexpensive, allowing for high profit. Id. If this policy
did not encourage the production of HCFC-22, it would greatly
benefit the Kyoto Protocol regime's goal of stabilizing the
global atmosphere because of HFC-23's high global warming

27

controls any substance "not controlled by the Montreal
Protocol."56 Although the Montreal Protocol mandates the phaseout of HCFC-22,57 developing countries have until a production
freeze in 2016 before they have to begin phasing out HCFC-22.58
The Montreal Protocol regime estimates that, especially in

potential. Id. at 7; IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at
6 (demonstrating the high global warming potential of HFC-23).
56

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art 2 (stating multiple

times that its regulations exclude substances controlled by the
Montreal Protocol); UNFCCC, supra note 13, at art. 4 (exempting
substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol from climate
change regulations).
57

See TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 27-28 (predicting that

developed nations such as the United States and the European
Union will successfully phase-out the use of HCFC's by the
targeted date of 2015). The European Union will ban imports of
HCFC's in 2008. Id. at 28. The air conditioner market in the
United States, likewise, almost entirely comprises of imports
from countries that have to phase-out HCFC's by 2015. Id. at 27.
58

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 7 (citing TEAP HCFC Report,

supra note 43) (stating that developing countries have between a
production freeze in 2016 until 2040 to phase-out HCFC-22).

28

China, South America, and India,59 the production and use of
HCFC-22 will result in the emission of two billion metric tonnes
of carbon, which will cancel out any gains against greenhouse
gas emissions made by the Kyoto Protocol.60
The process of manufacturing HCFC-22 results in the
emission of the chemical HFC-23 as a pollutant.61 The Kyoto
Protocol regime regulates the emission of HFC-23 because it is a
hydro fluorocarbon.62

In fact, HFC-23 has one of the highest

global warming potentials of any greenhouse gas regulated by the
Kyoto Protocol.63

59

Under the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development

See TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 40 (stating that

China, India, and South America are likely to increase HCFC-22
production between now and 2015).
60

See EIA Report; supra note 5, at 9 (stating that HCFC-22

emissions and manufacture will produce twice as much greenhouse
gas emissions as the Kyoto Protocol plans to reduce by 2012).
61

See id., at 6 (stating that HFC-23 is a byproduct of HCFC-22

manufacture).
62

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (listing HFC's as

regulated greenhouse gases).
63

See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 6 (stating

that the global warming potential of HFC-23 is 14,310 times that
of carbon dioxide).
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Mechanism companies that capture and destroy HFC-23 can make
large profits.64

Therefore, by giving emissions credits for the

destruction of HFC-23, the Kyoto Protocol regime indirectly
supports the production of HCFC-22, a substance that the
Montreal Protocol Regime attempts to phase-out.65
D. International Legal Frameworks That Could Resolve the
Conflicts Between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols
According to the International Court of Justice, there are
four sources of international law.66
64

The Statute of the

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 9 (reporting that companies

in Kyoto Protocol parties can receive a five to fifteen dollar
credit for each metric tonne of greenhouse gases that they
destroy). It only takes about twenty cents to destroy a metric
tonne of HFC-23, which results in a profit of several dollars
regardless of how large the Kyoto Protocol emissions credit. Id.
65

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (describing

the phase-out of HCFC's). See also TEAP HCFC Report, supra note
43, at 2-3 (discussing progress made towards ending the use of
HCFC's in developed countries).
66

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38

(describing conventional law, customary law, general principles
of law accepted by civilized nations as sources of law, and
previous cases and academic legal writings as sources of legal
interpretation).
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International Court of Justice states that international
conventions and international custom accepted as law as are
accepted sources.67

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

("VCLT") is the main source of conventional conflict of treaty
law unless the treaty itself specifies a conflict resolution
clause.68

If conventional law is inadequate to resolve the

conflict, customary international law, "a consistent and general
state practice reflected in the text of treaties which the
parties agree that they are obliged to follow," can resolve
conflicts.69

67

See id. (defining conventional law as general or particular

conventions establishing rules, and customary international law
as generally followed international custom accepted as law).
68

See Seyed Ali Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts

between Treaties, 47 (2003) (stating that if a treaty does not
have specific conflict resolution clause, the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties will prevail).
69

See id., at 99 (mentioning that the International Court of

Justice also defines state practice as national court practice
and government documents). This comment focuses on what SadatAkhavi refers to as "treaty practice of state" in his discussion
of customary international law. Id. at 108. But see Mark E.
Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on
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1. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
The VCLT discusses the resolution of treaty conflicts in
six different clauses.70

Articles 59,71 53,72 and 6473 deal with

the Theory and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources 50 (2nd
ed. 1997) (stating that the difficulty in ascertaining whether a
general state practice is accepted as law have led scholars to
question the concept of customary international law).
70

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 47 (listing the different

clauses where the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties deals
with conflicts between treaties, which are articles 30, 40-41,
53, 59, and 64).
71

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 59, May 22,

1969, 331 U.N.T.S. 1155 [hereinafter VCLT] (stating that a
treaty can be terminated by a later treaty if appears that the
later treaty is intended to govern the same subject matter and
is so incompatible with the earlier treaty that the two cannot
coexist).
72

See id., at art. 53 (stating that a treaty is void if it

conflicts with a generally accepted principle of international
law).
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conflicts where one treaty negates the existence of another.74
Articles 4075 and 4176 deal with conflicts where both treaties
remain valid, but one of them changes the other.77

Article 30 of

the VCLT specifically addresses conflicts between two treaties
with the same subject matter when both treaties remain valid,
but the provisions of one treaty prevail over the other.78

73

See id., at art. 64 (stating that when a new generally

accepted principle of international law is established, all
previous treaties that follow the old rule are void).
74

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 47 (stating that Article

59 of the VCLT will terminate one of two conflicting treaties
and Articles 64 and 53 will invalidate one of two conflicting
treaties).
75

See VCLT, supra note 71, at art. 40 (stating that an amendment

to a treaty only binds the parties who agree to it).
76

See id., at art. 41 (stating the conditions by which two or

more parties to a multilateral treaty can modify the treaty).
77

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 47 (stating that Article

40 of the VCLT deals with amended treaties and Article 41 deals
with modified treaties).
78

See VCLT, supra note 71, at art. 30 (defining the conflict

resolution framework for treaties dealing with the same subject
matter); Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 59 (quoting VCLT, supra

33

Although Article 30 constitutes the most important and
comprehensive provision of the VCLT concerning conflicts of
treaties,79 legal scholars have criticized it for having overly
ambiguous language,80 and inadequately addressing treaties that
confer different obligations onto different states.81 Finally,
courts rarely invoke Article 30.82

note 71, at art. 30) (noting that the title of Article 30 of the
VCLT is "successive treaties relating to the same subject
matter).
79

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 59-60 (stating that

Article 30 is the VCLT's most prominent article on the
relationship between treaties).
80

See id., at 60 (arguing that ambiguous language in Article 30

of the VCLT regarding general treaties, special treaties, and
treaties pertaining to the same subject matter).
81

See id., at 70-71 (arguing that Article 30 fails to address

situations where a treaty confers conflicting obligations to
different states).
82

See Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 Geo.

Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 573, 604-606 (2005) (arguing that Article 30
of the VCLT is generally weak). Borgen argues that despite an
increasing number of treaties, Article 30 of the VCLT has only
occasionally applied to conflicts between treaties. Id. at 605.
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2. Customary International Law
Customary international law plays an important role in the
development of international environmental law.83

Over the last

several decades treaty practice has developed concerning the
conflict of treaties in the international environmental law
context.84

First, the principle of lex specialis, which states

Article 30's limited application to successive treaties dealing
with the same subject matter is problematic because legal
authorities have narrowly interpreted the meaning of "same
subject matter." Id. at 603-605. Furthermore, courts do not
generally adjudicate treaty conflicts because the parties
themselves usually resolve conflicts politically. Id. at 605.
83

See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the

United States § 601 (1987) (stating that states must conform to
customary international rules to prevent, reduce, and control
any potential injury to the environment of another state); Peter
Orebech et al., The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable
Development 386-87 (2005) (using the Rio Declaration's
principles of sustainable development and the "precautionary
principle" as examples of customary international environmental
law).
84

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 163 (arguing that

environmental law treaties usually use the "most favorable
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that a specialized treaty will prevail over a general one,85
applies to treaty conflicts in general.86 The Basel Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste
("Basel Convention"),87 the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"),88 the

treaty" principle in resolving conflicts with bilateral and
regional treaties).
85

See Borgen, supra note 82, at 589 (defining the principle of

lex specialis as the principle which states that narrow treaties
shall prevail over broad treaties).
86

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68 at 101-102 (describing

instances where courts have applied the principle of lex
specialis).
87

See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements

of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal art. 11, Mar. 22, 1989,
1992 U.N.T.S. 126 [hereinafter Basel Convention] (stating that
previous and future treaties that are equally or more favorable
to the Basel Convention's goal of "environmentally sound
management of hazardous wastes" are valid).
88

See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of

Wild Fauna and Flora art. 14, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243
[hereinafter CITES] (stating that CITES does not prohibit its
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Convention on Biological Diversity,89 and Convention on the
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific
("Driftnet Convention")90 apply the "most favorable treaty"
principle to treaty resolution. The principle of "most favorable
treaty" allows for other treaties to coexist with these

parties from entering into treaties that implement stricter
regulations on the trade of endangered species.)
89

See David R. Downes, Integrating Implementation of the

Convention on Biological Diversity and the Rules of the World
Trade Organization 55 (1999) (citing Convention on Biological
Diversity art. 22, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818) (demonstrating
that Article 22 of the Convention on Biological Diversity allows
for any treaty to coexist with the Convention on Biological
Diversity so long as it does not cause serious damage or
threaten biological diversity).
90

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 164 (citing Convention on

the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South
Pacific art. 3, Nov. 24, 1989, 1899 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Driftnet Convention]) (stating that the Driftnet Convention
allows agreements that are more favorable to the elimination of
long driftnet fishing).
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multilateral environmental agreements if they act more favorably
towards the goals of these treaties.91
Variations of the "most effective treaty" principle exist
in international environmental law as well, such as in the
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses ("Convention on International Watercourses").92

The

principle of "most effective treaty," is usually applied to
international judicial treaties, such as the Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters

91

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 168 (defining the "most

favorable treaty" principle as treaties allowing for more
favorable treaties, regardless of whether or not these treaties
are regional, bilateral, or universal in their scope).
92

See Alistair Rieu-Clarke, International Law and Sustainable

Development: Lessons from the Law of International Watercourses,
134 (2005) (citing Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses art. 8, May 21, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter International Watercourses Convention])
(quoting the International Watercourses Convention as stating
that states will cooperate to most effectively protect
international watercourses).
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("Hague Evidence Convention")93 and the Hague Convention on
International Access to Justice ("Hague Access Convention").94
Other treaties contain principles of party cooperation that
could help resolve the conflict between the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocols. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution ("CLRTAP") mandates cooperation between parties in the
regulation of transnational air pollution.95 Also, the European
Union's proposed Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and

93

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 168 (citing Hague

Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters art. 32, Mar. 18, 1970, 847 U.N.T.S. 241
[hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]) (stating that the Hague
Evidence Convention makes exceptions for treaties that have more
effective evidence rules).
94

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 169 (citing Hague

Convention on International Access to Justice art. 21, Oct. 25,
1980, 19 I.L.M. 1505 [hereinafter Hague Access Convention])
(stating that the Hague Access Convention makes exceptions for
treaties that more effective in achieving its objectives).
95

See Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution art.

3, Nov. 13, 1979, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter CLRTAP]
(stating as principles the effective coordination of efforts to
contain air pollution).
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Restriction of Chemicals Directive ("REACH Directive") takes
into account the best available substitute during its chemical
authorization process.96 The principles from these treaties, when
applied to the conflicts between the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocols, could resolve the conflicts by forcing the regimes to
coordinate their regulation of chemicals and apply the best
available substitutes.
II. ANALYSIS
The conflicts between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols are
between permissive and prohibitive norms. The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties and the principle of lex specialis cannot
adequately resolve these conflicts. However, the principle of
"most favorable treaty" can resolve the HFC-134a conflict.

96

See Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization, and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), at art. 57, COM (2003) 644
final (Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter REACH Directive] (describing
the process by which the European Union will authorize a
chemical under REACH). The REACH Directive implements the
"substitution principle." Id. The European Community is unlikely
to authorize the use of a chemical that damages the environment
if there is a more environmentally sound substitute available.
Id.
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Likewise, the principles of "most effective treaty" and
principles of cooperation can resolve the HCFC-22/HFC-23
conflict.
A. The Conflicts Between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols
are Between Permissive and Prohibitive Norms.
The conflicts between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols are
between permissive and prohibitive treaty provisions, also
called treaty norms.97 There are three different kinds of treaty
norms in international law: obligatory,98 permitted,99 and

97

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 5 (defining at treaty norm

as a treaty provision that compels, allows, or prohibits an
action).
98

See id. at 5 (defining an obligatory norm as a treaty

provision that mandates a certain action); see, e.g., Montreal
Protocol supra note 12, at art. 2A (stating that parties must
phase-out the use of CFC by a certain date).
99

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 5 (defining a permissive

norm as a treaty provision that allows an action but does not
mandate it); see, e.g., Basel Convention, supra note 87, at art.
11 (stating that parties may enter into agreements so long as
they are at least as favorable as the Basel Convention to the
goal of environmental sound transport of hazardous wastes).
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prohibited.100 Types of conflicts between these treaty norms
include when one action is subject to both a permitted and
prohibited norm,101 and when a treaty permits one action but
another permits its unavoidable consequence.102

Generally, the

international legal community does not accept the possibility of
permissive norms conflicting with one another.103

100

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 5 (defining a prohibitive

norm as a treaty provision that prohibits the parties from
taking a certain action); see, e.g., Montreal Protocol, supra
note 12, at art. 4 (stating that parties cannot purchase CFC
from non-parties after a certain date).
101

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 8 (describing a conflict

in which one treaty says parties must give medical aid to
prisoners of war in hospitals while another treaty says that the
parties may aid them in prison camps).
102

See id., at 10 (describing a conflict in which one treaty

allows the replacement of railroad tracks while another
prohibits interrupting the flow of traffic, an unavoidable
consequence of replacing railroad tracks).
103

See id., at 35 (stating that permissive norms regulating the

same activity cannot conflict). But see Erich Vranes, The
Definition of 'Norm Conflict' in International Law and Legal
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The Kyoto Protocol discourages the use of HFC-134a because
it is a greenhouse gas; the Montreal Protocol encourages the use
of HFC-134a as a substitute for CFC in refrigeration and air
conditioning equipment.104 The caps in the Kyoto Protocol are
numbers unrelated to specific substances,105 and countries could
cap the emissions of other greenhouse gases and leave HFC's
alone and choose to cap other substances,106 making the caps
permissive norms. However, the use of HFC's as substitutes for
CFC's could take the production of HFC's past the Kyoto Protocol
caps, especially in developing countries where HFC's are funded

Theory, 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 395 (2006) (arguing that permissive
norms can conflict if they are "norms of conduct").
104

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that the while

HFC's are capped by the Kyoto Protocol the Montreal Protocol
regime encourages their use as substitutes for CFC).
105

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex B, (displaying the

greenhouse gas emission cap goals for various states).
106

See id., at art. 3 (demonstrating that parties can reach cap

obligations by capping the emissions of greenhouse gases in a
variety of ways).
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by the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund.107 Therefore,
prohibitive norms in the Kyoto Protocol,108 conflict with
permissive norms in the Montreal Protocol.109
The Kyoto Protocol regime indirectly supports the
production of HCFC-22, a substance that the Montreal Protocol
Regime phases-out, by giving emissions credits for the
destruction of HFC-23.110 Although the Montreal Protocol regime
does not require developing countries to phase-out the use of

107

See generally Project Completion Report ALG/REF/26/INV/30,

supra note 54 (demonstrating the funding of HFC's as CFC
replacements in developing countries).
108

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 3 (stating that

parties will reduce greenhouse gas emissions to their required
point by the year 2012, including HFC's).
109

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2 (implying

that the Montreal Protocol allows parties to use HFC's as
replacements for CFC's because they the Montreal Protocol regime
does not specifically regulate them). Article Two lists the
substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Id; Project
Completion Report ALG/REF/26/INV/30, supra note 54 (HFC-134a is
funded by the Montreal Protocol regime as a CFC replacement).
110

See TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 23-26 (discussing

progress made towards ending the use of HCFC's).
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HCFC's until 2015,111 it is contrary to the purpose of the HCFC
phase-out for countries to increase production of HCFC before
the Montreal Protocol regime requires them to decrease their
production.112 The Kyoto Protocol regime indirectly encourages
the production of HCFC-22 by allowing industries to profit by
destroying the byproduct of its manufacture, HFC-23.113
Therefore, permissive norms in the Kyoto Protocol which allow
and indirectly encourage HCFC-22 production114 implicitly

111

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (describing

the schedule by which HCFC's will be phased out).
112

See id. (stating that the Montreal Protocol regime plans to

phase-out the use of HCFC's because of their potential to damage
the ozone layer); TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 75-76
(demonstrating the Montreal Protocol regime's concern about
developing countries increasing their production of HCFC's
before they are required to phase them out); EIA report, supra
note 5, at 8 (stating that production of HCFC-22 is expected to
increase dramatically in China before 2015).
113

See EIA report, supra note 5, at 9 (demonstrating the profit

that industries can make by capturing and destroying HFC-23).
114

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 2 (demonstrating

that the Kyoto Protocol exempts from its controls any substance
"controlled by the Montreal Protocol").
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conflict with prohibitive norms in the Montreal Protocol that
plan to phase-out HCFC's.115
B. The VCLT Framework Cannot Adequately Resolve the
Conflicts Between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols
Article 30 of the VCLT cannot adequately resolve the
conflict between the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols. Article 30
governs the relationship between successive treaties to the same
subject matter.116 The international legal community generally
agrees that courts should narrowly construe the "same subject"
provision of Article 30.117 When a treaty sets forth that it is
either subject to or not incompatible with an earlier treaty,

115

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (describing

the process by which the Montreal Protocol regime has begun to
phase-out HCFC's).
116

See VCLT, supra note 71, at art. 30 (setting forth the

governance of treaties relating to the same subject matter).
117

See Borgen, supra note 82, at 603 (citing Anthony Aust,

Modern Treaty Law and Practice 183 (2000)) (summarizing Aust's
argument that the "same subject matter" provision should be
narrowly construed so that a general treaty and a specific
treaty do not conflict); see also Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68,
at 60 (questioning the whether Article 30's scope is too
indefinite to make it applicable to real-world situations).
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the earlier treaty prevails.118 If there is no specification,
parties to both treaties must only follow the earlier treaty
where it is not compatible with the later treaty.119
Article 30 does not apply to treaties with different
overall subject matters even if the treaties contain conflicting
issues.120 For example, if the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species conflicted with a treaty conserving the
habitats of endangered species, the treaties would not govern
the same subject matter sufficient for Article 30.121 CITES would

118

See VCLT, supra note 71, at art. 30 (stating that earlier

treaties prevail over latter treaties that are either subject to
or compatible with the earlier treaty).
119

See id. at art. 30 (stating that parties to two treaties are

only bound to the earlier one as far as it does not conflict
with the later treaty).
120

See Borgen, supra note 82, at 600-604 (arguing that a

conflict between a human rights treaty and a trade treaty with
provisions impacting human rights would be outside the scope of
Article 30); Id. at 60-604. Therefore, the treaties would not
govern the same subject matter necessary for Article 30. Id.
121

See id., at 610-613 (outlining an argument that CITES cannot

conflict with the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas
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have to conflict with another treaty dealing with trade in
endangered species for Article 30 to apply.122 Likewise, if a
protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity governing
trade in bio-engineered organisms conflicted with a World Trade
Organization ("WTO") agreement, Article 30 does not apply
because one treaty deals with the environment and the WTO deals
with trade, instead of both treaties dealing with trade or the
environment.123

of Wildlife, because CITES governs trade in endangered species
and SPAW governs habitat conservation).
122

See also id. at 612 (implying that for Article 30 to apply to

a conflict between the CITES and another treaty, the other
treaty would have to deal specifically with trade in endangered
species).
123

See Borgen, supra note 82, at 614 (stating that the Biosafety

Protocol to the Biodiversity Convention may conflict with WTO
obligations, but Article 30 would not apply because the treaties
govern different subject matters); cf. Sikin Jinnah, Emissions
Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: NAFTA and WTO Concerns, 15
Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 709, 717-718 (2003) (describing
Article Ten of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(“GATT”), which is the precursor of the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), as granting exceptions to WTO commitments in favor of
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Although the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols both govern the
global atmosphere,124 the Kyoto Protocol governs the chemical
process of climate change, and the Montreal Protocol governs the
chemical process of ozone depletion.125 For Article 30 to apply,
both treaties would have to govern climate change or both would

conditions that could include environmental treaties). The
environmental side of a trade and environment dispute would
likely try to persuade the WTO to grant it a human or
environmental health exemption, while the trade side of the
dispute would claim that such an exemption would not be
necessary. Id. at 733-34. This means that a trade and
environment dispute would more likely deal with Article Ten of
the GATT rather than Article 30 of the VCLT or customary
international law. Id. at 722-23.
124

See UNFCCC, supra note 13, at art. 2 (stating that the

purpose of the UNFCCC and its protocols is to stabilize
greenhouse gas emissions in the global atmosphere); Vienna Ozone
Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2 (stating that the purpose
of the Vienna Ozone Convention and its protocols is to protect
the ozone layer in the global atmosphere).
125

See also EIA Report, supra note 5, at 4 (describing the

differences between the chemical processes which result in ozone
depletion and climate change).

49

have to govern ozone depletion. Therefore the treaties do not
govern the same subject matter sufficiently for Article 30 to
apply.
If the common subject of governing the global atmosphere
was narrow enough for Article 30 to apply, several ambiguities
between the protocols would render it useless to solve the
conflicts between them. Article 30's conflict resolution
principles rely on the time that treaties open for signature.126
Article 30 fails to distinguish if this refers to amended
treaties or the original treaties.127 This ambiguity is

126

See VCLT, supra note 71, at art. 30 (stating that treaty

conflict resolution under Article 30 is contingent on which
treaty is "earlier" and which one is "later").
127

See Ryan L. Winter, Comment, Reconciling the GATT and WTO

with Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Can We Have Our Cake
and Eat it Too?, 11 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 223, 237
(2000) (questioning which treaty comes first when a treaty has
been amended several times); see also Sadat-Akhavi, supra note
68, at 73-76 (describing how it is unclear based on Article 30
whether treaties should date from adoption or entry into force).
But see Borgen, supra note 80, at 602-604 (stating that many
countries interpret Article 30 to mean adoption and to disregard
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especially problematic in regard to the Montreal and Kyoto
Protocols, which are both protocols to previous treaties.128
Furthermore, the Montreal Protocol contains several
amendments,129 and both treaties have meetings/conferences of the
parties that continually make policy decisions on
implementation.130 Therefore, even if Article 30 applied to the
common subject matter of regulating substances that damage the
global atmosphere, it would not apply to conflicts between the
Montreal and Kyoto Protocols because of ambiguities related to
which treaty would be "first in time."

entry into force, but also stating that a treaty technically has
no parties until it enters into force).
128

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at pmbl. (stating that the

Kyoto Protocol is a protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change); Montreal Protocol, supra note 12,
at pmbl. (stating that the Montreal Protocol is a protocol to
the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer).
129

See DeSombre, supra note 21, at 53-54 (listing the amendments

to the Montreal Protocol).
130

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 9 (describing the

role of the Conference of the Parties); Montreal Protocol, supra
note 12, at art. 11 (describing the role of the Meeting of the
Parties).
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C. The Principle of Lex Specialis Does Not Apply to the
Conflicts Between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols
Lex specialis131 does not apply to the conflicts between the
Kyoto and Montreal Protocols. The rule of lex specialis states
that a specialized treaty will prevail over a general one.132
Generally, lex specialis can only apply to a treaty conflict if
the treaties have different subject matters for Article 30 of
the VCLT purposes.133 For lex specialis to apply, conflicting
treaties must have a conflict between generality and
specificity.134 For example, if a an international civil
procedure rules convention conflicted with a bilateral agreement
131

See Borgen, supra note 82, at 589 (defining the principle of

lex specialis as the principle which states that narrow treaties
shall prevail over broad treaties).
132

See Winter, supra note 127, at 238-39 (2000) (outlining the

rule of lex specialis in the international environmental law
context)
133

See Borgen, supra note 82 at 604-605 (citing Andrea Schultz,

The Relationship Between the Judgments Project and Other
International Instruments 14 (2003)) (summarizing an argument
that article 30 of the VCLT is narrowly construed to allow for
the rule of lex specialis)
134

See also id. at 589 (stating that lex specialis only applies

to the "breath or narrowness of certain clauses)
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with a different subject matter, but the convention had more
specialized rules, the convention would prevail.135
The Kyoto and Montreal Protocols have different subject
matters for Article 30 purposes.136

However, the Kyoto Protocol

regime exempts from its regulations substances controlled by the

135

See, e.g., Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 101, (describing

conflict between the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure and a
bi-lateral arbitration treaty between Germany and Switzerland).
A Swiss Federal Court found that the Hague Convention on Civil
Procedure prevailed because it had more specific provisions in
regard to Civil Procedure than the arbitration treaty. Id.
136

See UNFCCC, supra note 13, at art. 2 (stating the purpose of

the UNFCCC and its protocols is to prevent radical changes in
the earth's climate); Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 12, at
art. 2 (stating the purpose of the Vienna Ozone Convention and
its protocols is to prevent ozone depletion); see also Borgen,
supra note 82, at 603-604 (stating that two treaties must have
the same subject matter for Article 30 to apply). Borgen states,
for instance, that a human rights treaty can only conflict with
another human rights treaty, not a human rights treaty
concerning trade, for Article 30 to apply. Id.
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Montreal Protocol.137 Likewise, the Montreal Protocol does not
control substances regulated by the Kyoto Protocol.138 Neither
protocol governs substances more generally or more specifically
than the other because they govern different substances.
Therefore, the principle of lex specialis does not apply to the
conflicts between them.
D. The "Most Favorable Treaty" Concept from Customary
International Law Can Resolve the HFC-134a Conflict, but
Not the HCFC-22/HFC-23 Conflict
The "most favorable treaty" concept can resolve one of the
conflicts between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols. Many
multilateral environmental agreements contain variations of the
concept of giving preference to the "most favorable treaty.”139

137

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 2 (stating in

several places that the Kyoto Protocol regime does not regulate
substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol).
138

Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (stating the

chemicals regulated by the Kyoto Protocol) with Montreal
Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2 (listing the Montreal
Protocol regime's control measures for an entirely separate
group of substances).
139

See, e.g., Basel Convention, supra note 87, at art. 11

(stating that the Basel Convention does not conflict with
another treaty that is at least as favorable as it is towards

54

For a subsequent treaty to be more favorable, it first has to be
relevant to the goal of the original treaty.140 Then, the
subsequent treaty has to be at least as favorable to

the goal of environmentally sound trade in hazardous wastes);
see also Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 164 (stating that
generally multilateral environmental agreements follow the "most
favorable treaty" concept, including the Basel Convention and
the Convention on the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets
in the South Pacific); Downes, supra note 89, at 55 (citing
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 89, at art. 22)
(quoting the Convention on Biological Diversity, which states
that an international convention only conflicts with the
Convention on Biological Diversity if it causes serious damage
or a threat to biological diversity).
140

See CITES, supra note 88, at art. 14 (stating that treaties

regulating trade in endangered species do not conflict with
CITES as long as they are at least as strict as CITES in their
governance); see also Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 163-64
(interpreting the Basel Convention as stating that a treaty must
have the common goal of environmentally sound trade of hazardous
wastes to be considered more favorable).
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accomplishing that goal as the original treaty.141 Unlike Article
30, the "most favorable treaty" principle can apply to conflicts
between treaties with overlapping issues but different overall
subject matters.142
The Montreal Protocol regulates the use of greenhouse gases
in the case of HCFC's,143 and the Kyoto Protocol regulates the
use of a commonly used substitute for ozone depleting substances

141

See also Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 163-64 (stating that

the Basel Convention allows for treaties that are more
conductive to the environmentally sound transport of hazardous
wastes as it is and the Driftnet Convention allows for treaties
that are more protective of fish then it is).
142

See Borgen, supra note 82, at 603-604 (stating that legal

authorities interpret "same subject matter" in Article 30 of the
VCLT narrowly); Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 168 (arguing
that the "most favorable treaty" principle allows treaties to
most favorably achieve common goals regardless of the status of
the treaties).
143

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (stating the

regulations of HCFC's); IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15,
at 6 (stating that HCFC's are generally potent greenhouse
gases).
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in the case of HFC's.144 Therefore, like a bilateral treaty
dealing with trade in hazardous waste would be relevant to the
goal of the Basel Convention,145 and a treaty protecting fish
stocks in the South Pacific would be relevant to the Driftnet
Convention,146 the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols are relevant to
each other's goals because they have different positions as to
HFC's and HCFC's, which both contribute to problems with the
global atmosphere.147

144

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (listing HFC's

among other greenhouse gases); EIA Report, supra note 5, at 6
(describing HFC's as substitutes for ozone depleting
substances).
145

See also Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 163 (arguing that

the "most favorable treaty" provision of the Basel Convention
foresees bilateral and regional agreements that would regulate
the trade of hazardous wastes).
146

See also id., supra note 52, at 164 (arguing that the

Driftnet Convention allows for treaties that better regulate
South Pacific fish stocks).
147

See IPCC/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 6

(demonstrating the climate change potential of HFC-134a);
Benedick, supra note 3, at 126 (stating that the Montreal
Protocol regime promotes the use of HFC's as substitutes for
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The "most favorable treaty" concept, can resolve the HFC134a conflict between the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols. The
principle of "most favorable treaty" would mean that the
relevant treaty would prevail over a previous or subsequent
treaty that is hostile to its goals.148 Although the Kyoto
Protocol is subsequent to the Montreal Protocol,149 it is more
favorable to the goal of protecting the global atmosphere in
regard to HFC's, because the Kyoto Protocol regime caps their

ozone depleting substances because they do not contribute to
ozone depletion, despite their contribution to climate change).
148

See Basel Convention, supra note 87, at art. 11 (stating that

the "most favorable treaty" principle applies to treaties
entered into before the Basel Convention as well as subsequent
treaties); see also Downes, supra note 89, at 55 (citing
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 89, at art. 22)
(quoting the Convention on Biological Diversity, which states
that an international convention conflicts with the Biodiversity
Convention if it causes serious damage or a threat to biological
diversity).
149

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 28 (stating that

the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997); Montreal Protocol,
supra note 12, at art. 15 (stating that the Montreal Protocol
opened for signature in 1987).
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emission and the Montreal Protocol regime does not.150 Therefore,
the Kyoto Protocol would prevail over the Montreal Protocol in
regard to the HFC-134a conflict.
However, because the Kyoto Protocol exempts substances
controlled by the Montreal Protocol from its regulations.151 This
provision renders moot the "most favorable treaty" principle
concerning the HCFC-22/HFC-23 conflict. The Montreal Protocol
regime actively works against the use of HCFC-22, restricting
its funding by the Multilateral Fund,152 and setting a schedule

150

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (listing HFC's

as substances controlled by the Kyoto Protocol); Montreal
Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2 (demonstrating that HFC's are
not regulated by the Montreal Protocol); IPCC/TEAP Special
Report, supra note 15, at 6 (demonstrating the greenhouse gas
potential of HFC's)
151

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 2 (demonstrating

that the Kyoto Protocol exempts from its regulation substances
controlled by the Montreal Protocol).
152

See Benedick, supra note 3, at 377-78 (demonstrating that the

Multilateral Fund originally would not promote the use of HCFC's
if there is a more environmentally sound alternative). But see
EIA Report, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that the Multilateral
Fund has refused to fund the phase-out of HCFC-22).
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to phase-out the substance's use.153 Meanwhile, the profitability
of destroying HFC-23, the byproduct of HCFC-22's production,
results in the Kyoto Protocol indirectly supporting the
production, and therefore the use of, HCFC-22.154
Even if the Montreal Protocol were to prevail in a conflict
with the Kyoto Protocol because it is more favorable to the goal
of ending the use of chemicals that damage the global
atmosphere, the Kyoto Protocol could not regulate HCFC-22
because it exempts substances controlled by the Montreal
Protocol.155 Therefore, the most favorable treaty principle
cannot resolve the HCFC-22/HFC-23 conflict between the Montreal
and Kyoto Protocols.156

153

See TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 81 (describing the

scheduled phase-out of HCFC's).
154

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 9 (demonstrating the

profitability of the destruction of HFC-23, the byproduct
produced during the manufacture of HCFC-22).
155

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 2 (stating that the

Kyoto Protocol only regulates greenhouse gases that the Montreal
Protocol regime does not control).
156

But see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 9 (describing

the Conference of the Parties apparatus and leaving open the
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E. The Montreal Protocol is More Effective Than the Kyoto
Protocol in Regard to the HCFC-22/HFC-23 Conflict, but the
"Most Effective Treaty" Principle Does Not Resolve the
Conflict
The "most effective treaty" principle and principles of
treaty cooperation can resolve the HCFC-22/HFC-23 conflict. The
"most effective treaty" principle states that if there is a
conflict between two treaties with a common objective, the
treaty that is most effective in achieving that objective
applies.157
The principle of "most effective treaty" often applies to
conflicts between international judicial treaties.158 Treaties
such as the Hague Evidence Convention work together with other
treaties with common goals, and therefore any conflict between
these treaties would result in the application of the treaty

possibility that the Kyoto Protocol regime could reduce the
credit for the destruction of HFC-23).
157

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 168-69 (demonstrating the

principle of most effective treaty in the Hague Evidence
Convention, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, and the Hague Access Convention).
158

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 170 (concluding that

treaties dealing with judicial matters often employ the "most
effective treaty" principle).
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most suitable to achieving.159 For example, if the Hague Evidence
Convention conflicted with a bilateral arbitration treaty with
less restrictive evidence taking procedures in some capacities,
but not in others, the bilateral treaty would apply to
situations where it is more effective and the Hague Convention
would prevail in areas where it is more effective.160
If the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols both regulate chemicals
that damage the global atmosphere, within this framework the
treaty that is more effective in preventing damage would apply.
The Montreal Protocol controls HCFC's and the Kyoto Protocol
does not,161 meaning that the Montreal Protocol is more effective

159

See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 68, at 170 (citing Hague

Evidence Convention, supra note 91, at art. 32) (stating that
the Hague Evidence Convention does not conflict with treaties
that have more accessible evidence gathering procedures).
160

See id. (arguing that the parties used the "most effective

treaty" principle so that the Hague Evidence Convention would
not conflict with bilateral or regional treaties that have less
restrictive evidence taking systems).
161

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (not listing

HCFC's as regulated by the Kyoto Protocol); Montreal Protocol,
supra note 12, at art. 2F (detailing the Montreal Protocol
regime's regulation of HCFC's).
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at controlling HCFC's. The Montreal Protocol would therefore
prevail over the Kyoto Protocol in the HCFC-22/HFC-23 conflict.
However, because the Montreal Protocol does not control HCFC-22
in developing countries until 2015,162 the Montreal Protocol
regime cannot resolve the HCFC-22/HFC-23 conflict until 2015.163
F. The Montreal Protocol Regime Has a Present Legal
Obligation to Cooperate With the Kyoto Protocol Regime in
Resolving the HCFC-22/HFC-23 Conflict
The Montreal Protocol regime must presently cooperate with
the Kyoto Protocol regime to achieve the most effective
regulation of the global atmosphere. The International
Watercourse Convention and CLRTAP state that the parties to
these treaties will cooperate to achieve the maximum
effectiveness of containing transnational water and air

162

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (stating

that while developed countries phase-out HCFC-22, developing
countries do not have to phase-out HCFC-22 until a production
freeze in 2015).
163

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 8-10 (arguing that the

Montreal Protocol regime cannot currently resolve the HCFC22/HFC-23 conflict because it would have implement a faster
phase-out of HCFC's to resolve the conflict).
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pollution respectively.164 Parties to these agreements share
research and consultation to achieve maximum effectiveness.165
The Vienna Ozone Convention takes this principle a step further
and mandates cooperation between the parties to its protocols
and "relevant international bodies."166

164

See CLRTAP, supra note 95, at art. 3; (demonstrating that

CLRTAP mandates party cooperation in research and
implementation);

Rieu-Clarke, supra note 92, at 169 (citing

Convention on International Watercourses, supra note 92, at art.
8) (establishing that the parties have an "obligation to
cooperate" on the regulation of international watercourses).
165

See CLRTAP, supra note 95, at art. 3 (demonstrating that the

parties to CLRTAP share information to achieve maximum
effectiveness); Rieu-Clarke, supra note 92, at 169 (citing
Convention on International Watercourses, supra note 92, at art.
9) (demonstrating that parties to the International Watercourses
Convention exchange data and information so that the treaty can
achieve maximum effectiveness).
166

See Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2

(stating that parties to the Vienna Ozone Convention and its
protocols will cooperate with competent international bodies);
Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 14 (stating that the

64

Parties to the International Watercourse Convention and
CLRTAP have to cooperate with each other to ensure the most
effective regulation of water and air pollution through their
domestic, regional, and bilateral apparatus.

167

The Vienna Ozone

Convention states that its parties must cooperate with
international bodies when implementing its protocols, including
the Montreal Protocol.168 Like parties in the International

Montreal Protocol defers to the Vienna Ozone Convention unless
otherwise stated).
167

See CLRTAP, supra note 95, at art. 3 (demonstrating that the

parties to CLRTAP share information to achieve maximum
effectiveness); Rieu-Clarke, supra note 92, at 169 (citing
Convention on International Watercourses, supra note 92, at art.
9) (demonstrating that parties to the International Watercourses
Convention exchange data and information so that the treaty can
achieve maximum effectiveness).
168

See Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2

(stating that parties to the Convention and its protocols will
"co-operate with competent international bodies to implement
effectively this convention and its protocols."); Montreal
Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 14 (establishing that the
provisions in the Vienna Ozone Convention relating to its
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Watercourse Convention and CLRTAP have to cooperate with each
other, parties to the Montreal Protocol regime have to cooperate
with "competent international bodies." Both the Kyoto and
Montreal Protocol regimes regulate substances that damage the
global atmosphere.169 Therefore, the Kyoto Protocol regime could
be a "competent international body" for Montreal Protocol
purposes.170

protocols apply to the Montreal Protocol unless the text of the
Protocol states otherwise);
169

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (listing

substances regulated by the Kyoto Protocol because their
emission results in climate change); Montreal Protocol, supra
note 12, at art. 2 (listing substances controlled by the
Montreal Protocol because of their ozone depletion potential).
170

See Vienna Ozone Convention, supra note 12, at art. 2.

(stating that the Vienna Ozone Convention and its protocols must
cooperate with "competent international bodies"). The Vienna
Ozone Convention does not state what it means by a "competent
international body." Id. See generally Jong Mallabed, et al.
(eds.), Inter-Linkages between the Ozone and Climate Change
Conventions: Part I: Inter-Linkages between the Kyoto and
Montreal Protocols (2001) (describing various links between the
Kyoto and Montreal Protocol regimes).
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The cooperation principle encourages parties to cooperate
with each other and relevant international bodies to provide the
best way of achieving a common goal.171

If the parties apply

these principles to the HCFC-22/HFC-23 conflict, no treaty
prevails over the other. Instead, this principle mandates that
the parties to the Montreal Protocol, amend the Montreal
Protocol regime to cooperate with the Kyoto Protocol regime, a
competent international body.172 Therefore, the parties to the
Montreal Protocol, and through them the Montreal Protocol
regime, have a present legal obligation to cooperate with the

171

See CLRTAP, supra note 95, at art. 3 (stating that parties to

CLRTAP must cooperate in research); Rieu-Clarke, supra note 92,
at 169) (citing Convention on International Watercourses, supra
note 92, at art. 9) (mandating that parties cooperate in data
sharing and implementation).
172

See generally Mallabed, supra note 170 (demonstrating that

the Kyoto and Montreal Protocol regimes have come together to
study the connections between climate change and ozone
depletion).

67

Kyoto Protocol regime in ending the HCFC-22/HFC-23 conflict as
soon as possible instead of starting in 2015.173
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
To resolve the conflicts between the Kyoto and Montreal
Protocol regimes, the Montreal Protocol regime should implement
a phase-out of HFC's and speed up the phase-out of HCFC's. It
should also better encourage parties to replace ozone depleting
substances with the best environmentally sound substitute.
Finally, the Montreal Protocol regime should implement a
structure that allows for greater coordination with the Kyoto
Protocol regime.
A. The Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund Should Phase
Out the Funding of HFC's and Implement a Faster Phase Out
of HCFC's
To resolve the HFC-134a conflict with the Kyoto Protocol,
the Montreal Protocol regime should stop encouraging the use of
HFC-134a. The Montreal Protocol regime cannot directly control
the use of the substance however, because it does not deplete

173

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (stating

that the phase-out of HCFC-22 in developing countries such as
China and India will not begin until 2015).
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the ozone.174 Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol controls the
emissions of HFC-134a.175
The Montreal Protocol regime should end the funding of HFC134a in the same way that it mandates the phase-out of HCFC's.
The Montreal Protocol sets a schedule for developed nations to
end the use of HCFC by different percentages every few years.176
Developing nations have HCFC use capped in 2014, and phased out
by 2040 by a similar schedule.177 Similarly, the parties to the
Montreal Protocol should reduce the funding of HFC-134a by a
percentage and on a schedule that they agree to as fair. This
way, the Montreal Protocol regime will end its support of HFC-

174

See Benedick, supra note 3, at 126 (stating that because

HFC's do not contain chlorine, they do not contribute to ozone
depletion).
175

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at annex A (listing HFC's

along with other greenhouse gases regulated by the Kyoto
Protocol regime).
176

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (describing

the phase-out of HCFC's in the Montreal Protocol regime).
177

See id. (demonstrating that the phase-out of HCFC's for

developing countries mirrors the phase-out for developed
countries, but begins later).
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134a while doing it slowly enough so that companies who use the
substance in cooling units can adapt to the new regulation.
Likewise, the Montreal Protocol regime should set a faster
phase-out of HCFC's. Currently, the Montreal Protocol sets the
phase-out for HCFC's in developing nations to begin in 2014.178
However, the production of HCFC-22 has greatly increased in
recent years, especially in China.179 Furthermore, if the
Montreal Protocol regime allows HCFC-22 production to continue
at the present rate, HCFC-22 will have adverse effects on the
ozone layer and climate system.180 Therefore, the Montreal

178

See id. (stating that Montreal Protocol regime will cap the

production of HCFC's in developing countries in 2014 at whatever
the production level is at that time).
179

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that in the last

five years, China has become the largest producer of air
conditioners in the world and that the vast majority of these
units use HCFC-22 as a coolant).
180

See Benedick, supra note 3, at 122 (demonstrating that that

HCFC's in the atmosphere may delay ozone layer recovery); EIA
Report, supra note 5, at 9 (demonstrating that if current HCFC22 production trends continue, the emission of HCFC-22 will
negate any gains made by the Kyoto Protocol against climate
change).
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Protocol regime should set a faster timetable for the phase-out
of HCFC-22 as soon as possible instead of beginning in 2015.181
B. The Montreal Protocol Regime Should Establish a Formal
Review Process to Encourage the Best Environmentally Sound
Substitutes for Ozone Depleting Substances.
The Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund has not always
funded the transfer of replacement substances for HCFC-22
between parties.182 The Montreal Protocol allows parties to use
"transitional substances" such as HCFC-22 even if there is an
environmentally sound substitute.183 Parties must only take
"every practicable step consistent with the programs supported
by the financial mechanisms" when furthering the use of the best
environmentally sound substitutes for ozone depleting

181

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 2F (stating

that the phase-out of HCFC's in developing countries such as
China and India will not begin until 2015).
182

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 8 (arguing that the

Multilateral Fund has been unwilling to help phase-out HCFC-22
because of its failure to fund replacement substances).
183

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 15, at art. 10 (encouraging

parties to transfer the best environmentally sound substitutes
for ozone depleting substances to other parties but not
mandating it); TEAP HCFC Report, supra note 43, at 75 (defining
HCFC-22 as a transitional substance, along with other HCFC's).
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substances.184 Article 10 of the Montreal Protocol, which
establishes the Multilateral Fund, does not contains provisions
allowing for the review or authorization of the best
environmentally sound substitutes.185
The European Union's REACH Directive proposes a system that
would usually mandate the best environmentally sound substitute
for chemicals.186 The REACH Directive will not authorize the use

184

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 10 ("Each party

shall take every practicable step, consistent with the
programmes supported by the financial mechanism...to ensure that
the best available environmentally sound substitutes and related
technologies are transferred).
185

See id., at art. 10A (stating that the Multilateral Fund

should ensure that the developed parties transfer the best
environmentally safe substitutes to developing nations, but not
setting forth a process for reviewing substitutes).
186

See generally REACH Directive, supra note 96. (proposing the

system that Regulates, Evaluates, and Authorizes the use of
chemicals in the European Union). If the European Union passes
REACH into law, it will require registration only in regard to
most chemicals, but the EU will not authorize a dangerous
chemical unless there is a social or economic benefit that
outweighs its effects. Id. at art. 57. First, an industry must
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of an environmentally damaging chemical generally unless the
social utility of the chemical outweighs the risk of damage to
the environment.187 Specifically, organic pollutants and
carcinogens are subject to strict authorization procedures.188

register a chemical with the European Community. Id. at art. 6.
If the chemical poses a risk to human health or the environment,
the chemical then the EC must authorize it. Id. at art. 53. Most
chemicals do not need to go through the authorization procedure,
only the most dangerous ones. Id.
187

See id. at art. 53(setting forth the authorization procedure

in the REACH Directive).
188

Sarah Harrell, Beyond 'Reach'? An Analysis of the European

Union's Chemical Regulation Program Under World Trade
Organization Agreements, 24 Wis. Int'l L.J. 471, 492 (2006)
(describing the registration and authorization program in the
REACH Directive proposal, and stating that if a substance is
bio-accumulative or carcinogenic, the European Commission will
not authorize its use unless it can be shown that the risks can
be controlled or that the benefits outweigh the risk of use).
See also REACH Directive, supra note 96, at art. 58 (stating
that for the European Community to authorize the use of a
dangerous chemical if risks cannot be controlled, the proposal
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Even if the European Community authorizes a environmentally
dangerous substance, the REACH directive gives it broad powers
over restricting its use.189
The Montreal Protocol could implement a procedure similar
to that of the REACH directive with an addition to Article 10.190
The Montreal Protocol regime can implement a structure similar
to the authorization procedure in the REACH Directive, allowing
it to review, authorize, and restrict substitutes for ozone
depleting substances. This would greatly discourage the use of
environmentally damaging substances, such as HCFC-22, as
replacements for ozone depleting substances.

for authorization has to include analysis of alternatives and an
updated substitution plan).
189

See REACH Directive, supra note 96, at art. 64 (describing

the process by which the European Union can restrict and
regulate a chemical that has to go through the authorization
procedure). An agency makes determination on regulation based on
risk assessment and socio-economic analyses similar to that
necessary for authorization. Id.
190

See Montreal Protocol, supra note 12, at art. 10 (setting

forth the structure of the Multilateral Fund without allowing it
to review substitutes for ozone depleting substances for
potential harm to the environment).
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C. The Montreal Protocol Regime Should Define "Most
Environmentally Sound Alternative" Based on Integrated
Analysis With the Kyoto Protocol Regime
When defining "most environmentally sound alternative," the
Montreal Protocol regime should implement risk assessment
techniques that consider both ozone depletion potential and
global warming potential.191 For example, HCFC-123, which
industries use for emissions-free heavy industrial cooling
equipment, has a low global warming potential, a low ozone
depletion potential, and its high energy efficiency.192 If the
parties consider all three factors in analyzing the use of HCFC123, there is a strong argument for the Montreal Protocol Regime
to consider exempting emissions free use of HCFC's.193 By

191

See also Grubb, supra note 3, at 265-66 (describing the Kyoto

Protocol as insufficient for long term climate change control,
and implying that the treaty is locked in place).
192

See Anderson & Zaelke, supra note 44, at 171 (stating that

the use of HCFC-123 in industrial chillers by the Trane
Corporation has resulted in an alternative to CFC's with a long
life cycle, high energy efficiency, and low ozone depletion and
global warming potentials).
193

See id., at 168-68 (arguing that the Montreal Protocol regime

should exempt emissions free HCFC's because of their longer life
cycle and high energy efficiency when compared to non-HCFC's).
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balancing several factors in its analysis other than ozone
depletion potential, the Montreal Protocol regime can find
substitutes for ozone depleting substances that will not
conflict with the Kyoto Protocol.
CONCLUSION
The Montreal Protocol currently encourages the use of
greenhouse gases as substitutes for ozone depleting
substances.194 Likewise, the Kyoto Protocol's credit system
encourages the production of ozone depleting substances.195
However, because the Kyoto Protocol's regulation of HFC-134a is
more favorable to the goal of regulating the emission of
chemicals that damage the global atmosphere, the Montreal
Protocol should phase-out its funding of HFC-134a as a
substitute for ozone depleting substances. Furthermore, if the
Montreal Protocol speeds the phase-out of HCFC-22, authorizes
only the most environmentally sound substitutes for ozone
depleting substances, and defines what is most environmentally
sound using ozone depletion potential, global warming potential,

194

See ICPP/TEAP Special Report, supra note 15, at 6

(demonstrating that HCFC's and HFC's are greenhouse gases).
195

See EIA Report, supra note 5, at 8 (demonstrating the profit

potential for the destruction of HFC-23, which is a byproduct of
manufacturing HCFC-22).
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and energy efficiency, the Montreal Protocol regime will fulfill
its present legal obligation to cooperate with the Kyoto
Protocol regime.
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